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INDEX.
ABDUCTION.
1. In action for abduction of child, expenses of pursuit may be reco-
vered. Rice vs. Nickerson, 703.
2. Evidence in such suit. Id.
ACCORD.
Two partners under advice of a friend made a settlement; evidence that
the friend was mistaken as to some fact is not material. Thompson vs. Bten-
nett's Administrators, 120.
ACTION. See AFFIDAVIT oF DEFENCE, 2; CONTRACT, 21; CORPORATION, 9,
18. FoRMEn RECOVERY; FRAUD; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1, 8; LIMITA-
TION, 10.
1. Where balance due on a contract is placed to the credit of a third per-
son, the latter cannot maintain an action for it in his own name. Robertson
vs. Reed, 252.
2. Lies immediately on refusal of a party to perform an essential part of
an award, though the time for performance of other parts of the award has
not yet arrived. Bayne vs. Morris, 63.
3. Whether it lies for consequences of a lawful act. Note to Mori* vs.
Platt, 532.
ACTS OF CONGRESS.
1789, Sept. 24. See ADMIRALTY, 2.
1789, Sept. 24, Sect. 25. See COURTS, 7.
1841, Aug. 19, Sect. 8. See BANKRUPTCY, 3.
1845, Feb. 26. See ADmIRALTY, 2.
1861, July 13, Sect. 6. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 1, 3.
1862, Feb. 25. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, IL
1862, May 20. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 3.
1862, July 11. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, IL
1863, Feb. 25, Sect. 11. See BANKS, 2.
1863, March 8. See HABEAS CORPUS.
1863, March 12. See INTERNATIONAL LAw, 18.
1864, June 80. See STAMP, 1.
1864, July 2, Sect. 3. See CONSTITUTIONAL L&w, 3, 6.
1864, July 4. See CONSTITUTONAL LAW, 19.
ADMIRALTY.
1. Jurisdiction of United States courts not exclusive, in all cases of mari-
time torts. Trevor vs. Steamboat Hine, 436.
2. Jurisdiction under Acts of 1789 and 1845. Id.
VoL. XIII.--49 (769)
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AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENCE.
1. Judgment for want of, may be taken on a foreign judgment. Luckenbadr"
vs. Anderson, 252.
2. The fact that defendant was decoyed into the state where such judg-
ment was obtained is not a sufficient defence. Id.
AGENT. See BANKs, 1; HusBAen AND WIFE, 32; VENDOR AND VENDEE, 23.
1. The same rules apply as to agents of public bodies and private per-
sons. Thorn vs. Comm'rs., 807.
2. Authority without restriction to an agent to sell, carries with it autho-
rity to warrant. Schuchardt vs. Allens, 53.
3. Of defendant in suit before justice may offer judgment. Randall vs.
Wait, 637.
4. Evidence admissible to show agency in contract signed in his own
name. Lernid vs. Johns, 703.
. Evidence of frequent sales of property of one person by another is
competent to prove agency. Bragg vs. R.R. Co., 703.
6. How far principal is affected by his agent's knowledge acquired in
other transactions, 138.
7. Knowledge of agent that party from whom he purchases is not the
owner of goods is notice to the principal. Dresser vs. Norwood, 807
ALLUVION. See MUNICIPAL ConroRn.TioN, 1, 4.
AMENDMENT.
1. Changing action from one ex delicto to one ez contractu is not allowable.
Whitcomb vs. Hudgerford, 183.
2. A variance between the complaint and proof in such case is not amend-
able. Id.
APPOINTMENT. See WILL, 12.
ARBITRATION AND AWARD. See AcTIox, 2.
The power of arbitrators is exhausted when they have once finally deter-
mined matters before them. Bayne vs. Morris, 53.
ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS. See PAnTEnRSHIP, 1, 2.
1. Title of purchaser from assignee is good though the assignment be
.fraudulent. Sheldon vs. Stryker, 262.
2. Simple -contraet creditor cannot set aside assignment. Coope vs.
Bowles, 122.
2. -Receiver cannot maintain an action which the parties he represents
could not, and he must show their right and his authority. Id.
ASSUMPSIT. See CORPORATiox, 8; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 5.
Lies for services rendered in PA-ving property carried away by freshet.
Sheldon vs. Sherman, 383.
ATTACHMENT.
1. Owner of properly..ttphed may.have action against the attaching
officer for negligence pen'ding.the attachbeut. Briggs vs. Taylor, 56.
2. Damages in such case may be paid ito,.court to await the determina-
tion of the original attachment suit. ;Td.
ATTORNEY. See EVIDENCE, 9; FnAum, 'SATU " 0, 8; HUSBAND AND
WirE, 25; JUDGmENT, 2; LisnTvAToxS, 11.
1. An assignment of verdict and judgment to ,be entered upon it to the
attorney is valid, and will give him a preference ,in equity to defendants
claiming to set off a previous judgment against the asaignor. Mackey vs.
Mackey, 437.
2. The equity to have the set-off does not arise till judgment is entereil
in the second action. Id.
BAIL. See CRIxiNAL. LAw, 6.
BAILMENT.
Gratuitous bailee not liable for carelessness of his servant in lighting his
pipe.. Woodman vs. Joiner, 808.
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* BANKRUPTCY.
I. EXPEDIENCY OF A BANKRUPTCY LAW, 449.
2. EARLY BANKRUPT LAWS, 581.
3. Act of 1841, sec. 8, construed. Banks vs. Ogden, 509.
BANKS AND BANKING.
1. The bank, by putting a person at the desk of the receiving teller, makes
him an agent as to parties delivering money, &c., to him for the cashier.
Hotchkiss vs. Bank, 381.
2. Directors of national bank may remove president before the adoption
ef by-laws. Act of 1863. Taylor vs. Hutton, 703.
3. Where a banker is in the habit of receiving negotiable paper for col-
lection, and the transmitting banker fails, owing the receiving banker a
balance, the latter cannot retain hig collections on paper so received, if he
knew it was for collection merely, or if he did not give a credit to the trans-
mitting banker on the faith of such paper. Sweeny vs. Easter, 115.
BASTARD.
Complaint not maintainable in Massachusetts for support of bastard born
in another state. Grant vs. Barry, 437.
BELLIGERENTS. See INSURANCE, 1; INTERNATIONAL LAW, I.
BILLS AND NOTES. See BANKS AND BANKERS, 3; MORTGAGE, 3; NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS, 1.
I. Indorser does not waive notice of non-payment by taking from maker
a mortgage to secure himself, and selling the property under it. ffaskell
v. Boardman, 118.
2. Where holder of a check sends it to drawees through the post, and does
not receive the money by return mail, that is a dishonor of which indorsers
should be notified. Bailey vs. Bodenham, 308.
3. Whether presentment by mail is good, quore. Id.
4. Surety is not discharged by a notice to the holder to sue the principal
debtor, unless the notice is clear. Shimer vs. Jones, 308.
5. Married woman surety is entitled to such notice, and notice to husband
is not sufficient, though if intended for the wife, it becomes a question of
service merely. Id.
6. Indorser not notified of dishonor offering to pay in depreciated notes
of bank holding the bill, does not waive the notice. Newberry vs. Trow-
bridge, 570.
7. Mortgage security to accommodation indorser-rights of indorsee on
insolvency of maker and indorser. Savings Institution vs. Bank, 511.
8. Procuring the signature of a new party, as if an original maker, with-
out indorser's knowledge, does not discharge the latter. MtcCaughey vs.
Smith, 190.
9. Note, payable on demand with interest, transferred to bond fide holder
three months after its date, is not hubject in his handsIto original equities.
Herrick vs. Wolverton, 190.
10. Person induced by fraud to make a note, may set up the fraud in
defence to an action on a new note, given for the original one before the
discovery of the fraud. Sawyer vs. Wiswell, 704.
11. Due-bills, indorsed by initials, mlid, and holder may fill them up as
payable to himself. Weston vs. yers, 704.
BILLS OF EXCEPTION.
Should be to each instruction specifically. Harvey vs. Tyler,.767.
BOND. See SURETY, 1, 2, 8.
BOUNDARY. See EVIDENCE, 7; VENDOR AND VENDEE, 8
BOUNTY. See CERTIORARI, 2; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 21.
BRIDGE.
A railway viaduct affording no facilities for crossing a river except to
railway cars, is not a bridge within the Act of New Jersey of 1790. Bridge
Proprietors vs, Zroboken Co., 55.
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CALIFORNIA SPECIFIC CONTRACT LAW. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, , 14.
CASES APPROVED, OVERRULED, &c.
Best vs. Allen,.30 Illinois 30, explained. .Brown vs. Coon, 507.
Boyd vs. Cudderbuck, 31 Illinois 113, affirmed. Brown vs. Coon, 507.
Burr vs. Duryee, 1 Wall. 553, affirmed. Case vs. Brown, 575.
Owens vs. Missionary Society, 14 N. Y. Rep. 880, dissented from. ¢ck-
nor's Estate, 269.
Patterson vs. Knight, 29 Illinois 514, explained. Brown vs. Coon, 507.
Quain's Appeal, 10 Harris 510, affirmed. Williams's Appeal, 812.
Smith vs. Miller, 31 Illinois 153, affirmed. Brown vs. Coon, 507.
State vs. Great Works Co., 20 Maine 41, approved. Indiana vs. Railroad
Co., 583.
Taylor et at. vs. Painter, 3 Phila. Rep. 865, affirmed. 'Williams's Appeal,
312.
CASE STATED. See CouRTs, 4.
CERTIORARI. See COURTS, 8: HUSBAND AND WIFE, 36.
1. Lies only to review proceedings of a judicial character. People vs.
Supervisors, 704.
2. Proceedings of a board of supervisors to raise money for bounties are
not judicial. Id.
3. Defendant in criminal case cannot have certiorari without special
allowance, but the Commonwealth may. Commonwealth vs. Capp, 637.
CHARITABLE USES. See MuNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS, 12.
Weight of time and acquiescence in determining character of trusts.
Note to New Market vs. Smart, 403.
CHECK. See BILLs AND NoTES, 2.
Merely lending money to holder of a check on faith of receiving the pro-
ceeds of the latter, will not without delivery constitute the lender a bona fide
holder as against the equities, against the original holder. Russell vs.
Scudder, 183.
OOLLATERAL SECURITY. See SECURITY.
COMMON CARRIER. See RAILROAD, 1.
1. The shipper is liable for freight, though not the owner of goods.
Wooster vs. Tarr, 183.
2. Carriers not liable on receipt for a bill of goods "for collection,"
beyond their route, without a special contract. Lowell Co. vs. Sargent, 183.
3. Person suing for damage to goods must show that they were in good
condition when delivered to the carrier. Smith vs. Railroad Co., 763.
4. If there were several connecting carriers, proof as to condition when
delivered to the first is sufficient. Id.
5. Statutory exemptions in favor of, p. 137.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See LISITATI6N, 1; MORTGAGE, 7.
Plaintiff cannot recover, if there is a bar to his procedure in the country
where he sues, though his rights are governed by another law. De la Rosa
vs. Prieto, 809.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
I. Quetions arising out of the Rebellion. See INTzRNATIONAL LAW.
1. Under the Act of Congress of 13th July 1861, sect. 5, goods forming
the cargo of a vessel proceeding to a point in the insurrectionary states, are
liable to forfeiture only while in transitu. United States vs. Schooner Francis
Hatch, 289.
2. And the vessel only while the contraband cargo is on board. Id.
8. But under the regulations made by the Secretary of the Treasury by
authority of the Acts of 13th July 1861, 20th May 1862, and 2d July 1864,
a vessel engaging in trade with the insurrectionary districts, is liable to for-
feiture even after the termination of the prohibited voyage and the discharge
of the contraband cargo. Id.
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4. The imposing of such forfeiture is within the power to make regula-
tions conferred on the Secretary of the Treasury by Acts of Congress.
United States vs. Schooner Francis Hatch, 289.
6. Congress has the constitutional right to confer such power, though
quasi legislative, on the Executive. Id.
6. Even if it be necessary for Congress itself to exercise such power, it
may be considered to have ratified and adopted such regulations by the Act
of 2d July 1864, sect. 3. Id.
7. Therefore, where a vessel had been engaged in prohibited trade, but
before the libel was filed, had completed her voyage and discharged her
cargo, a forfeiture was decreed by virtue of the regulations established by
the Secretary of the Treasury. Id.
II. United States Notes, Stocks, and Loans.
8. The New York law of 1863, providing that banks shall be liable .to
taxation on a valuation equal to the amount of their capital stock paid in or
secured to be paid in, is in substance a tax upon the property of the bank,
and so far as the capital of a bank is invested in the securities of the United
States, the act is unconstitutional and void. The People vs. Commissioners
of Taxes, 277.
9. The -specific contract law" of the state of California is valid and does
not conflict with the Act of Congress of July 11, 1862, making Treasury
notes lawful money and a legal tender in the payment of private debts.
Carpenter vs. Atherton, 225.
10. The legislature niay provide that judgments shall be payable in the
kind of money specified in the contract on which it was rendered. Id.
11. Constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act discussed. Note to Oarpen-
ter vs. Atherton, 233.
12. Legal Tender Acts are cofistitutional. Van Husan vs. Kanouse, 571.
13. Constitutionality of Acts authorizing legal tender notes, 162.
14. Power of a state to enforce payment of debts in specie, notwithstand-
ing the Legal Tender Acts, 165.
15. By a lease of property in British dominions, money was payable in
"dollars and cents of U. S. currency." A tender of U. S. legal tender notes
held not sufficient. Nova Scotia Tel. Co. vs. Am. Tel. Co., 365.
III. Powers of the People.
16. The amended constitution of Tennessee, abolishing slavery, is valid.
lrilliamson vs. Jones, 651.
17. Courts organized under it are bound to consider it so. Id., note.
18. Modes of amendment of constitutions, legal and revolutionary, dis-
cussed. Note to Williamson vs. Jones, 656.
IV. Powers of Congress. See supra, 5; HABEAS CORPUS.
19. The provision of the Internal Revenue Act of July 4, 1864, requiring
writs in state courts to be stamped, is not within the sphere of the legisla-
tive powers of the Federal Government, and is inoperative. Warren vs.
Paul, 157.
20. Soction 8 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States contains a
delegation to Congress of power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Id.
V. Powers of the State Legislatures. See supra, 10; infra, VII., IX.
21. The payment of bounties to volunteers is for a public or municipal
purpose; and a law authorizing a municipality to raise money for this pur-
pose is therefore constitutional. Speer et al. vs. School Directors of Blairs-
ville, 661.
22. Power of legislature to authorize voting beyond the limits of the
state, 161.
23. Voting outside of state limits. Military Suffrage Act of Michigan, 334.
24. Powers of legislature to pass limitation acts, and what are such.
Price vs. lHopkin, 571; Groesbieck vs. Seelg, 572.
26. If a tax is legal in its inception, there is no limit to the power of the
legislature to provide for its collection. Litchfield vs. AtcComber, 319.
26. Legislature may pass a private act empowering a court to decree
private sale of an intestate's real estate. Slorentine vs. Barton, 764.
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VI. Powers of the Executive. See supra, 5; MissouRi.
27. When the governor returns a bill to the legislature, and his messen-
ger notifies them that it is a message from the governor, the provisions of
the constitution in reference to bills becoming law unless returned within a
certain number of days, is complied with, and the legislature cannot prevent
its effect by refusing to receive the message. Opinion Sup. Ct. N. H. 212.
28. T!he constitution gives a certain number of days, of twenty-four hours
each, and the governor's veto would still be in time if delivered to the
speaker on the last day, though after the adjournment of the house. Id.
29. The adjournment contemplated by the constitution is a final adjourn-
ment. Therefore, an intermediate recess for a few days, while the bill is
in the governor's hands, does not affect the time within which he should
return it. Id.
30. The presentation of the bill on a certain day at the governor's usual
place of receiving bills, is a presentation to the governor on that day. Id.
31. In New Hampshire the day an act is done is to be excluded in cotrl-
puting time. How far the computation of time under the section of the
constitution giving the governor five days to return a bill, can be affected
by a statute passed subsequently: Quere. Id.
VII. Regulation of Commerce.
32. A state law, laying a distinctive tax on the business of foreign cor-
porations doing business in a state, such business consisting of the trans-
portation of goods, in transitu, from state to state, is unconstitutional. Erie
Railway Co. vs. New Jersey, 238.
83. Whenever the taxation of a commodity would amount to a regulation
of commerce, so will the taxation of an inseparable incident of such com-
modity. Id.
84. A state cannot tax a foreign corporation on a principle different from
that on which she can tax one of her domestic corporations. Id.
35. The power to refuse a recognition of corporate existence does not
involve the right to tax a foreign corporation at the arbitrary discretion of
the government possessing such a power. Id.
36. The act of taxation is a recognition of the legal status of the corpora-
tion taxed, and admits that such corporation is clothed with all the rights
necessary to defend itself against illegal taxation. Id.
VIII. Obligation of Contracts. See EXECUTION, 2; HUSBAND AND WrIFE, 5, 6.
37. Where the legislature of a state in an act of incorporation retains
the right to revoke the charter, in case of abuse of the privileges granted,
the fact of such abuse must be established. Mayor, 1kc., vs. C. and S. P
Railroad Co., 750.
38. A statute repealing a statute by which stock was liable for the cor-
poration's debts impairs the obligation of contracts as to creditors at the
time of repeal. Hawthorne vs. Calef, 503.
IX. Taking Private Property without Compensation.
39. Money raised by a county by taxation is not private property, and its
ekpenditure may be directed by the legislature. State vs. County Court, 120.
40. Legislature may- take the franchises of a corporation for public use.
Kerr's Petition, 123.
41. Legislature may delegate the right of eminent domain to railroad
company. Id.
42. Title to land taken for a reservoir does not pass until compensation
is made or adequate security given to the owner. Borough of Easton'3
Appeal, 311.
CONTEMPT.
1. A person threatening a suitor to publish concerning her a statement
of facts, unless her suit were withdrawn, is guilty of contempt. E .parte
Chetwynd, 298.
2. Jurisdiction and mode of proceeding in cases of contempt. Id. Note.
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CONTRACT. See ACTION, 1: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 9, 14; EQUITY, 11 ; -MUNI-
CIPAL COnPOnATIO , 6; SUNDAY; VENDoR AND VENDEE, 6, 9.
I. Interpretation and Con8truction.
1. Where a contract is in writing, the intention of the parties must be
collected from the instrument itself. Pilmer vs. Bank, 336.
2. Words are to be understood in their popular sense, unless in respect
to the subject-matter, by known usages, they have acquired a peculiar sense
distinct from the proper sense. Id.
3. Cotemporaneous conversations and agreements are inadmissible in an .
action on a written contract, for the purpose of showing the meaning or in-
tention of the parties. Id.
4. 'In an action on a written contract, it is competent to show by parol
evidence that words used therein had, at the time such contract was entered
into, a local meaning different from their usual signification. Id.
5. In an action on a draft payable in "currency," parol evidence is ad-
missible to show the peculiar meaning of the word 'currency." Id.
6. Where a bond is convertible into stock within a certain time, an agree-
ment to extend the time of payment of the bond does not extend the right
of conversion. Muhlenberg vs. Railroad Co., 184.
7. Loan of corporation payable at a fixed time and place ceases to bear
interest at that time whether payment is demanded then or not. Emlen vs.
Lehigh Co., 253.
8. A simple agreement between owners of adjacent lands to erect uniform
buildings thereon does not, by implication, require that the buildings shall
remain the same after erection. Hubbell vs. Warren, 186.
9. If a thing sold is of greater or less value according to the lapse of
time, time is of the essence of the contract. Gale vs. Archer, 319.
10. As in case of a sale of farm with growing crops and stock requiring
personal attention. Id.
11. Or where vendor is to vacate his home and seek a new one. Id.
12. For sale of horse for 1000 dollars, part cash, and part in thirty days,
the part paid to be forfeited in case of default, is executory only, and does
not give title on which trover will lie until the payment of the whole price.
Whitcomb vs. ilungerford, 190.
13. Title under agreement of A. to purchase lumber with P.'s money, and
deliver to him on payment of charges. Weaver vs. Darby, 379.
14. Execution against A.'s interest., Replevin by purchaser. Id.
15. Agreement to build, and implied agreement to have the place ready-
builder may recover for increased expenses in consequence of neglect to
have the place ready. Allerman vs..3fayor, 502.
IT. Performance. See Foasnat REcOVERY, 3.
16. A. made an executory contract for the sale of goods to B. In an
action by the vendee against the vendor to recover damages for non-per-
formance, A. established by way of defence, that B. falsely and with frau-
dulent intent, and as an inducement for A. to enter into the contract,
represented that he had purchased goods of like quality, at the same price,
of one C., a person who was acquainted with their value, And in whose
judgment A. placed confidence. He also showed that he sold the goods to
B. at a stipulated price, relying upon the false statement. Held, that the
plaintiff could not recover. Smith vs. Countryman, 102.
17. The vendor under such circumstances had a right to rely upon the
vendee's statements without making inquiry of C. as to their truth. Id.
18. The false statement was material to the contract. The rule stated in -
Parsons on Contracts, approved: "If the fraud be such that, had it not
been practised, the contract would not have been made, or the transaction
completed, then it is material to it.' Id.
19. It is immaterial in such a case that the vendee agreed to pay the
market price on the day of sale. If the contract was induced by fraud, the
fraud is a complete defence to an action brought to recover damages for a
failure to fulfil the executory contract. Id.
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20. To build a house in a certain time, not excused by reason of a latent
defect in the soil compelling the taking down and rebuilding part of the
house. .Dermott vs. Jones, 504.
21. Action on such contract-acceptance--damages. Id.
22. Title to reward offered for stolen property. Besse vs. Dyer, 504.
23. Compromises made in court and under its advice. 141.
24. Bill for specific performance is for the discretion of the court. Gale
vs. Archer, 819.
III. Against Public Policy.
25. An agreement by vendors of stock that new directors nominated by
the purchaser shall be substituted for the present board, is contrary to pub-
lic policy, and will not be spedifically enforced. Fremont vs. Stone, 183.
IV. Parol Evidence to affect Written. See'supra, 3-5.
26. Where a price is fixed by writing, but the thing not adequately de-
scribed, parol evidence may be admitted. Chadwick vs. Comm'rs, 309.
CONTRACTOR. See NEGLIGENCE, 10.
CONTRIBUTION. See MORTGAGE, 15.
A creditor of a stock company requiring security, plaintiff and four others
gave a joint and several note, which they subsequently had to pay. Held
that the corporation was liable to each for what he had to pay; that as
between themselves each was liable for one-fifth of the amount; and that
this was not affected by the fact that the makers held unequal"interests in
the corporation. Coburn vs. Wheelock, 125.
CORPORATION. See CONSTITUTozAL LAw, 32-8, 40 ; CONTRAcT, 6, 7; Cazsu-
NAL LAW, 2, 5; MuNICIPAL CORPORATION; NEGLIGENCE, 12.
I. Acts, Powers, and Liabilities.
1. Corporation having power to borrow money on its own notes may do so
by pledge of its assets. Clark vs. Titcomb, 124.
* 2. Where it is the custom of a corporation to transfer its notes by mere
indorsement of its president, a transfer authorized by the directors is well
made by such indorsement. Id.
3. Row far one corporation may become the successor of another still
existing, discussed. Note to New Market vs. Smart, 402.
4. Where a person has a presumptive title to admission to corporate fran-
chises, the right of immediate expulsion should be clear, to justify his rejec-
tion. People vs. Hedical Society, 676.
5. Surety of the treasurer of a corporation "during his continuance in
office," &c., is not liable for default after omission to re-elect the treasurer,
though he continues to act as such; but surely is not discharged by a vote
of the corporation postponing the time of election. Lexington, 1ce., Railroad
Co. vs. Elwell, 309.
6. Corporation need not. accept treasurer's bond by a formal vote; nor
are they estopped from an action on it by accepting the report of auditor.
approving his accounts. Id.
7. Indorsement of treasurer on notes signed by himself is sufficient to
make surety liable. Id.
8. Is liable for services rendered after the chartering and before the
organization, if it has taken the benefits of such services. Low vs. Railroad
Co., 438.
9. Action will lie for compensation. Id.
10. Evidence in such action. Id.
11. Books not admissible as evidence in matters of private nature, in sup-
port of its claims. Wheeler vs. )alker, 605.
II. Directors and Stockholders.
12. The directors are the agents of the corporation, and not the corpora-
tion itself; and although they meet outside the limits of the state creating
the corporation, yet their proceedings will be valid and binding upon the
company. Ohio and .ilissisipli Railroad Co. vs. McPherson, 562.
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13. Where the directors named in the act of incorporation met and organ-
ized the company outside the limits of the state granting the charter, one
who has subscribed for the stock of the corporation by its corporate name,
and paid instalments called for by the directors, is precluded by his own acts
from denying the lawful existence of the corporation. Ohio and His. R. ..
Co. vs. 3fcPherson, 562.
14. Where the corporators met outside the limits of the state granting the
charter, and elected a board of directors, and such board made a call for
payment upon the subscription to the stock of the corporation, a subscriber
to the stock cannot, when sued for the call thus made,' object to the legality
of such election. Id.
15. Responsibility of directors in regard to purchases of shares, dis-
cussed. 130.
16. Stockholder may be allowed in equity to defend in the name of the
corporation for specific purposes. Bronson vs. Railroad Co., 571.
17. Payment of corporate debts by a stockholder in a foreign corporation
presumed voluntary. Eastman vs. Crosby, 184.
18. Action does not lie by one stockholder against another, to enforce
personal liability for debt of corporation. Richardson vs. Abendroth, 764.
19. The legal title and legal liability is in the person in whose name the
stock is registered. Id.
20. The rule that an unincorporated association cannot take by devise or
gift, applies only to land or to personalty where a permanent trust is created.
There is no incapacity to take an absolute, unconditional bequest of person-
alty. Yicknor's Estate, 269.
21. The statute of Michigan, relating to religious corporations, does net
apply to foreign religious corporations. Ia.
COSTS. See MORTOAGE, 11-13.
Whether allowed to a party to the distribution of money in court, is mat-
ter of discretion for the court. Borough of Easton's .Appeal, 311.
COURTS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 17; CosTS; MISSOURL
1. In General. See CERTIORARI, 2.
1. A tribunal provided by a statute on a general subject has exclusive juris-
diction, unless the contrary is clear from the act. Blacklot vs..Davenvort, 442.
2. Where a statute provides a tribunal for revenue matters, it will have
exclusive jurisdiction, but a party may resort to ordinary courts for a remedy
against the malice or corruption of a revenue officer. Id.
3. Whenever the evidence is not legally sufficient to warrant a recovery,
it is the duty of the court to instruct the jury accordingly. But if there be
evidence from which the jury may draw an inference in the matter, the
case ought not to be taken from them. Schuchardt vs. Allen, 54
II. United States Courts. See ADMIRALTY, 1; EJEOTMENT.
4. Supreme Court of United States cannot give judgment on a case stated
unless facts only are stated. Burr vs. Desmoines Co., 54.
5. The Courts of the United States, while sitting within the limits of a
state, are governed by the rules of evidence of such state. Ryan vs. Bindley,
54.
6. Error will lie from the Supreme Court of the United States to the
highest court of a state.
(a) Where a statute of the United States is technically in issue in the
pleadings, or is relied on in them, and is decided against by rulings asked
for and refused, even though the case may have been disposed of generally
-by the court on other grounds. State of Minnesota vs. Bachelder, 55.
(b) Where a statute of a state creates a contract, and a subsequent statute
is alleged to impair the obligation of that contract, and the highest court in
the state construes the first statute in such a manner as that the second stat-
ute does not impair it, whereby the second statute remains valid under the
Constitution of the United States. Bridge Proprietors vs. Hoboken Co., 55.
7. An appellant from the highest court of a state to the Supreme Court
of the United States, under the provision that "'where is drawn in question
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the construction of any clause of the Constitution, or of a statute of the Vnited
States, and the decision is against the title," right, &c., so set up, need not
set forth specially the clause of the Constitution of the United States on
which he relies. Bridge Proprietors vs. Hoboken Co., 55.
8. The Supreme Court of the United States has no power to review by
certiorari the proceedings of a military commission ordered by a general
officer of the United States Army commanding a military department. Ez
yarte Vallandigham, 55.
9. Jurisdiction having attached is not taken away by subsequent reduc-
tion of the sum in controversy. Cooke vs. U. S., 505.
III. State Courts. See Fo.mER REcovErY, 8.
10. Suit against U. S. marshal for wrong levy is not necessarily against
him as marshal, and hence not necessarily within the 25th section of the
Judiciary Act. Day vs. Gallup, 504.
11. After suit in Federal court is ended a state court may have jurisdic-
tion of the matter, though it could not have had it pending the proceeding.
Id.
12. The Louisville Chancery Court has jurisdiction of torts, but the amount
of damages must be settled by a jury. Lucas vs. Bruce, 95.
COURTS-IARTIAL. See COUNTS, 8.
COVENANT.
Licensee of mineral rights covenants to pay for damage to lands, this
covenant binds his assignee. NYorval vs. Pascoe, 310.
CRIMINAL LAW. See C-RTIORARI, 3; EVIDENcE, 2; JuRY; SELF-DEFENCE.
I. Process.
1. The proper process in a criminal prosecution is a warrant for the body
of the defendant. No other process is authorized by law in this state. In-
diana vs. 0. 4" A. Railroad Co., 583.
2. A summons is not a proper process in a criminal prosecution. And
the service of a summons, in a criminal prosecution against a body corpo-
rate, upon an agent, attorney, or director of the corporation, is not sufficient
to compel a corporation to plead. Id.
3. .Distringas, as a mode of compelling an appearance in a criminal case,
is a writ unknown to our law. Id.
4. The common law of England, as to crimes and misdemeanors, is not in
force in Indiana. Id.
5. A corporation can neither commit a crime or misdemeanor by any
positive or affirmative act, or incite others to do so, as d corporation. Id.
II. Bail.
6. A person charged with a capital crime may submit evidence before
trial, either on motion or on habeas corpus, to'show himself entitled, under
the constitution, to the privilege of bail. Lynch vs. People 733.
7. Proper tribunal to decide on bailability discussed. Id. Note.
II. False Pretences.
8. Where the. prisoner falsely stated himself to be a servant of A., but
was understood by prosecutor to say B., the conviction quashed. Queen vs.
Balmer, 312.
IV. Illegal Voting.
9. It is sufficient to allege that the election was held. State vs. Marshall,
507.
10. Proof in indictment for illegal voting. Id.
V. Insanity.
11. Onus is on defendant alleging insanity. State vs. McCoy, 120.
VI. Larceny.
12. Putting hand in empty pocket not an attempt to steal Reg. vs.
Collins, 310.
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CURRENCY. See CONTRACT, 5.
1." Means bank bills, &c., which pass as a circulating medium. Osqoad
vs. MConnell, 439.
2. Evidence not admissible to show meaning. Id. 438.
3. Measure of damages is the number of dollars specified. Id.
4. Certificate of deposit for current bank notes estops a party from deny-
ing the currency of the notes. Id.
5. Decisions on the interpretation of the word, reviewed. Rote to .Pilmer
"vs. Bank, 343.
DAMAGES. See ABDUCTION, 1; ATTACHMENT, 2; CONTRACT, 21 ; CUNRENCY, 3;
ERRon, 1; FonRETO ATTACHMENT, 1; INTERNATIONAL LAW, 8; PRYsIcIANs, 5.
1. If no special damages laid, plaintiff can recover only for such as arise
proximately from the breach of contract. Halloci vs. Belcher, 184.
2. In an action of trespass de bonis aportatis, the general rule for the
measure of damages is the value of the goods at the time of the taking, or
their-highest value between that time and the trial, with interest and damages
for any acts of outrage or oppression that may have accompanied the taking.
McEnroy vs. Dyer, 166.
3. But where there has been a redelivery of the goods to the owner or a
reacquisition by him, as by purchase at a sale, &c., the measure of damages
is what it has cost him to regain possession, what he has lost by the tempo-
rary deprivation of the use of the goods, and such other damages as will
make compensation for the injury. rd.
4. Laying out of view what may be recovered in trespass for outrage or
oppression in the taking, there is no difference in the measure of damages
whether the action be trespass or trover. Id.
5. For construction of a railroad through a farm the measure is the
market value of the land taken, and the jury may allow for loss from the
manner the farm is cut. E. Penn. Railroad Co. vs. Hottenstine, 184.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See ASsIGNMENT Fon BENEFIT OF, &C., 2;,
EQUITY, 9; LIMITATION, 5, 7, 12; MORTGAGE, 3, 9, 25, 28, 29; NOTICE, 3;
SUnETY, 4.
1. Debtor in failing circumstances may prefer one creditor.to another.
Carpenter vs. Mfuren, 255.
2. Conveyance held fraudulent as against creditor. Armstrong vs. Tut-
tie, 120.
3. Payment by debtor to creditor before debt is due, to aid creditor to
prevent his creditors from attaching the debt, is not void in Vermont. Fletcher
vs Pillsbury, 56.
4. Sale of his property by insolvent is not conclusive proof of fraud.
Loeshigh vs. Bridge, 185.
5. Nor will the sale be set aside, merely because creditors are delayed.
rd.
DECEDENTS' ESTATE. See ExEcUTOR.
If ancillary administration be taken out in another state, a judgment there
rendered cannot be proved against the estate in the decedent's domiciL
Low vs. Bartlett, 185.
DEED. See EquITY, 7; NOTICE, 1, 2.
1. Reservation of woodland "south of the meadow," includes all the
wood farther south than the meadow, though not in position directly south
of it. Cronin vs. Richardson, 310.
2. Deed of house and appurtenances includes a lot of ground used with
the house. Armmidown vs. Ball, 310.
3. Held void for uncertainty of description. Clemens vs. Rannels, 121.
4. Party in interest cannot take acknowledgment. Groesbeck vs. Seeley,
572.
5. Evidence admissible'to prove that no consideration passed, as it bears
on the amount of stamps required. Id.
DEPOSITIONS: See NOTICE, 4; STAMP, 2.
INDEX.
DISTRINGAS. See CRImiNAL LAw, 3.
DOMESTIC ANIMALS.
Responsibility of owner for damage done on the highway, 140.
DOMICIL.
1. How far that of the wife is controlled by the husband, discussed, 129.
2. Declarations in a will are evidence of domicil at a time shortly after.
Wilson vs. Terry, 704.
DUE-BILLS. See BILLS AND NOTES, 11.
EASEMENT. See WAY, 1, 2.
1. User of way from one part of an estate to another, does not pass by
implication on a severance of the estate. Worthington vs. Gimson, 311.
2. Easement of an alley-way between two lots, when the use was apparent
and continuous, does not merge, by unity of possession of the lots. McCarty
vs. Kitchenman, 311.
3. As affected by conveyance of portions of an estate at different times,
discussed, 134.
EJECTMENT. See VENDOR AND VENDEE, 6.
One trial may be conclusive by state law, and this will bind United States
courts. Hiles vs. Caldwell, 510.
ELECTIONS.
1. On trial of title to office the question is who received the most legal
votes. People vs. Pease, 185.
2. Inspectors of election are administrative, not judicial officers, and their
decisioi on the right to vote may be examined in subsequent proceedings. Id.
3. They have no right to reject a vote except in cases expressly authorized
by statute. Id.
4. Evidence in contested elections. Id.
ENGLISH JURISPRUDEiCE, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN, 1, 129.
EQUITY. See ATTORNEY; CONTRACT, 24; CORPORATION, 16; ESTATE FOR LIFE;
HUSBAND AND WIFE, III.; MORTGAGE, 5, 6, 11, 20; OFFicER, 2; PARTITION;
PARTNERSHIP, 4, 8; VENDOR AND VENDEE, 5.
1. Where a plaintiff and his ancestors had been in possession of an estate
for eighty years, and a defendant, claiming the estate under adverse title,
threatened to take possession, cut sods, and perform other damage, in order
to continue to bar the Statute of Limitations, the court granted an injunc-
tion. Lowndes vs. Bettle, 169.
2. The cases as to jurisdiction to interfere by injunction to restrain tres-
pass, show that-
3. Where defendant is in possession, and plaintiff claims under an adverse
title, the court will refuse to interfere except where the acts perpetrated or
threatened are acts of such flagrant spoliation as to induce it to depart from
the general principle. Id.
4. Where the plaintiff is in possession and the defendant claims under an
adverse title, the tendency of the court has been to grant an injunction: it
will at all events do so where the acts tend to the permanent injury or de-
struction of the estate. Id.
5. Where the plaintiff is in possession and the defendant is a stranger,
the court will generally refuse an injunction, and leave the plaintiff to his
remedy at law. Id.
6. Bemble, the tendency has been to cease to observe the distinction be-
tween trespass and waste, and to interfere in cases of trespass where inter-
ference seemed requisite. Id.
7. Bill will not lie by grantor to reform a deed where it appears that a
clause of the original agreement was left out, because he relied on the pro-
mise of the grantee. Andrew vs. Spurr, 310.
8. Trust resulting from purchase of land with another's money. McCart-
ney vs. Bostwiek, 572.
9. Rights of creditors in New York. Id.
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10. Bill in behalf of plaintiff and others who may come in. If no others
come in plaintiff must show his own title to relief. Hubbell vs. Warren, 186.
11. Court requires the clearest proof of fraud or mutual mistake to enter-
tain a suit to reform a written contract. Botsford vs. McLean, 808.
12. A party applying for an order to examine a party to the record in a
bill in equity, must make it appear that the proposed witness is without
interest at the time the order is asked. Anspach vs. Thompson et al., 362.
13. Whether such order is grantable of course on a suggestion of no in-
terest. or only on previous notice to the dpposite party, not decided. Id.
14. But in either case it must be made with a saving of all just exceptions
to the testimony when presented at the hearing. Id.
15. In bill for relief in case of stale trust, petitioner should set forth
specifically the reasons of his ignorance and the means of fraudulent con-
cealment practised on him. &c. Badger vs. Badger, 506.
16. In granting new trial on issues of fact, the court is guided by rules
in suits at law. Mark vs. Cong. Society, 439.
ERROR. See COURTS, 6, 7; FORMER RECOrERY, 2.
1. Opinion of the judge as to amount of damages not error. Oswald vs.
Kenned.', 638.
2. Refusal of court to open judgment on. trial of 'cire facias to revive, not
reviewable. Henry vs. Brothers, 638.
ESCAPE. See SHERIFF, 1-5.
ESTATE FOR LIFE. See TAXATION, 2.
Tenant for life of personal property may be compelled in equity to give
security to remainder-man. Lewey vs. Lewey, 120.
ESTOPPEL. See CORPORATION, 6, 13, 14; CURRENCY, 4; HOMESTEAD, 2;
HUSBAND AND WIFE, 7; INSURANCE, 5; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 8; NEGLI-
GENCE, 4.
1. Husband selling wife's horse and she being informed of it before pay-
ment neglects to object until after payment, she is estopped. Dann vs.
Cudney, 573.
2. Party will not be allowed to prove a fact where he has made an incon-
sistent admission, and the other party who has acted on it, would be injured
by the proposed proof. Hawley vs. Grisrold, 186.
3. Where a company has accepted land from the state under an act allow-
ing pre-emption to settlers on a part of the land, the company and its Ten-
dees are estopped from denying the right of the state to allow such pre-
emption. Baker vs. Gee, 54.
EVIDENCE. See ABDUCTiON, 2; ACCORD; AOENT, 4, 5; CONTRACT, 3-5; CoR-
PORATION, 10; COURTS, 5; CURRENCY, 2; DEED, 5; DOxICIL, 2; ELECTIONS, 4;
EQUITY, 12-14; FORMER RECOVERY, 2, 5-7; MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, 6; NEW
TRIAL, 1-3; SURETY, 1.
1. COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. EXCLUSION FOR INTEREST, 74,
2. TESTIMONY OF PARTIES IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS, 577.
3. Market value of an article at a given time and place may be proved by
sales of the saie or similar articles at times an# places not too remote.
Kingsbury vs. Hoses, 439.
4. Acknowledgments of assign ments, &c., before a commissioner of deeds,
admissible. Sheldon vs. Stryker, 253.
5. It is sufficient if the certificate be attached to the instrument when
offered in evidence. .d.
6. Plans in trial of land titles. Wood vs. Willard, 573.
7. Declarations of deceased persons as to boundaries are competent evi-
dence. Wood vs. Willard, 258.
8. Entries by persons since deceased admissible. Wheder vs. Walkcr, 505.
11. Books of Account. See CORPORAiION, 11.
9. Whether an attorney's books are admissible, guoere. H We Ez'rs. vs.
Ar"' Ez'rs., 688.
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10. Subjects of book charge. Hale's Bx'rs. vs. Ard's Ez'rs., 638.
III. Ezperts.
11. There is no established form of question to experts. Hunt vs. Gas-
light Co., 186.
12. Keeper of horses competent as expert to give opinion as to value.
McDonald vs. Christie, 191.
13. Of experts as to value of horse, not admissible. Low vs. Railroad
Co., 438.
EXECUTION. See EXECUTOR, 4; FOREIGN ATTACnMENT, 1.
1. Where goods of separate owners have been mixed, an officer attaching
goods of one of them must ascertain, if he can, what part belongs to each.
Carlton vs. Davis, 119.
2. Law granting a stay, notwithstanding a waiver, is unconstitutional.
Lewis vs. Lewis, 254.
3. Statutory notice to executor-burden of proof. Ransom vs. Williams,
573.
4. Defective levy-disagreement of certificate and return, as to time of
record. Ellison vs. Wilson, 573.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR. See DECEDENTS' ESTATE; EXECUTION, 3.
1. Where a person dies before the expiration of six years from the time
when a cause of action first accrued to him, his executor must, in order to
prevent the operation of the Statute of Limitations, commence his action
before the expiration of the six years. Penn.y vs. Brice, 433.
2. May recover back a claim paid where the estate appears insolvent, and
a dividend ordered to be paid, and the Statute of Limitations runs against
him from the date of the dividend ordered. Richards vs. Nightingale, 501.
3. Advancement of money for his testator's estate. .Nunroc vs. Holmes,
505.
4. Commissions not attachable. Adams's Appeal, 254.
FALSE PRETENCES. See CRIMINAL LAW, 8.
FALSE REPRESENTATIONS. See FRAUD.
FERRY.
RIGHTS OF RIPARIAN PROPRIETORS, 513.
FOREIGN ATTACHMENT.
1. Claim for unliquidated damages cannot be attached. McKean vs.
T zrner, 437.
2. Claim under policy before adjustment is unliquidated. Id.
FORMER RECOVERY. See CoURTs, 11; VENDOR AND VENDEE, 17.
1. A record showing nonsuit is no bar to second action. Audubon vs.
Inturance Co.. 182.
2. The decision in the first action having originally been that it be dis-
missed,-was afterwards changed to a nonsuit. On appeal in the second
action the propriety of this proceeding is not reviewable, and the amended
judgment is the only evidence of the disposition of the first action. Id.
3. Acceptance of & work by defendant after failure of plaintiff to recover
on the contract for its price will support an action on quantum valebat, but
such acceptance is not proved by mere use. Corwin vs. Wallace, 446.
4. Suit for portion of a demand, or one of several demands arising' out
of the same transaction, is a bar to subsequent suit for the residue, if it
was due when such suit was commenced. And this bar extends to buch
residue when pleaded as a set-off. Hoff vs. Heyers, 125.
5. Defence pot confined to cases where the matter is patent in the plead-
ings, but parol proof may be given. Miles vs. Caldwell, 510.
6. Parol evidence as to cause of action in the first suit. Boyce vs. Burt,
251.
7. Parol proof as to identity of cause of action. Hall vs. Jones, 440.
8. Decree in S. C. U. S. dismissing bill in equity, though by a divided
court, is a bar to suit in state court. Durant vs. Essex Co., 118.
INDEX.
FRAUD. Sec CONTRACT, 16-19; MORTGAGE, 2, 4; SURETY, 1; VENDOR AND
VENDEE, 8, 16-18, 20.
No action lies on false oral assurance of the credit of a corporation by the
treasurer. AicKinney vs. Whiting, 187.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See MORTGAGE, 2; VENDOR AND VENDEE, 19.
1. The defendant having retained the plaintiff as his attorney in any liti-
gation that might grow out of a qonveyance to him by his brother, John
Adams, who had failed; and in consideration of such retainer promised ver-
bally to pay him one-half of a debt, due to the plaintiff from said John, the
promise was within the Statute of Frauds. Fullam vs. Adams, 460.
2. A verbal promise to pay the debt of another, where the original debt
still subsists, is never legally binding, except where the promissor has
received the funds or property of the debtor for the purpose of being so
applied, so that an obligation or duty rests upon him, as between himself
and the debtor, to make such payment, whereby his promise, though in form
to pay the debt of another, is in fact a promise to perform an obligation or
duty of his own. Id.
3. A retainer of an attorney is a sufficient consideration to support a
written promise to pay such attorney a debt due him from another. Ad.
4. Promises to pay the debt of another discussed. Note to Fullam vs.
Adams, 473.
5. Contract for purchase of land-parol guaranty as to quantity not
enforceable. Dyer vs. Graves, 383.
FRAUDULENT AGREEMENT. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 3.
1. In a qui tam action against the creditor in a fraudulent judgment, or
the grantee in a fraudulent conveyance, for the statutory penalty, it is
necessary that the intent of both parties to the transaction should be ulti-
mately to defraud creditors. A design to hinder or delay them merely for
a time is not within the statute. .Barnum q. t. vs. Hackett, 56.
2. But if either party consists of more than one person, those who par-
ticipate in the fraudulent intent are not relieved from liability under the
statute, by the fact that all such persons are not guilty of a criminal de-
sign. Id.
FREIGHT. See CommoN CARRIER, 1; SHIPPING, 1.
GOVERNOR. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, VI.
GROUND-RENT. See JUDGMENT, 3.
1. Arrears accruing after decease of tenant' can only be collected out of
the realty. WVilliams's Appeal, 312.
2. But personal representatives may be sued therefor, judgment being
restricted to the land bound. Id.
GUARANTY. See VENDOR AND VENDEE, 11, 21.
GUARDIAN. See HUSBAND AND WIPE, 8.
Investing ward's money in a note of a single business house is not rea-
sonable care. Clark vs. Garfield, 312.
HABEAS CORPUS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 20; CRI3IINAL LAW, 6.
The rebellion being ended, the authority of the President under the Act
of 3d March 1863, 1, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
has expired. Corn. vs. .Frink, 700.
HIGHWAY.
Person using a defective way for purposes of play only, cannot sue the
town for negligence. Blodgett vs. Boston, 189.
HOMESTEAD.
1. Probate court has no jurisdiction. Woodward vs. Lincoln, 507.
2. Estoppel as to homestead right, by abandonment. Brown vs. Coon,
507.
8. Married woman may be estopped by acts inpais. Id.
4. Illinois bases on homestead reviewed. Id.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE. See BILLS AND NOTES, 5; DomIOIL, 1; ESTOPPEL, 1;
WILL, 15.
I. Marriage and Divorce.
1. Marriage is a civil contract and nothing more. It may be presumed
from cohabitation and reputation. It may be established by proof of the
declarations and admissions of the parties. Physick's Estate, 418.
2. Although the intercourse was originally meretricious, it is not neces-
sary to show when it ceased to be meretricious and became matrimonial. 1d.
3. A counter-presumption may be established by proof of subsequent mat-
rimonial cohabitation and reputation, and declarations of the husband. Id.
4. Where conflicting presumptions exist, those in favor of matrimony and
innocence must prevail. Id.
5. Legislature of state where wife alone is resident, cannot grant divorce
that will affect rights of property in another state where husband resides.
Todd vs. Kerr, 813.
6. Quere, if such an act would not be unconstitutional. Id.
7. Wife would not be estopped from denying its validity. id.
S. On allegation of third party that libellant for divorce is insane, the
court may appoint a guardian ad litem. Denny vs. Denny, 311.
9. Wife's leaving her husband with his consent and remaining absent, is
not desertion. Lea vs. Lea, 311.
II. Curtesy and Dower.
10. Husband has no curtesy in his wife's land in remainder. Shores vs.
Carley, 313.
11. Widow of tenant in common, whose interest was conveyed to his co-
tenant, may have a writ of dower. Blossom vs. Blossom, 505.
I1. Separate Estate of Wltfe.
12. Discussion of the wife's claim to a separate settlement out of her own
property, and rights of the children therein, 9.
13. A married woman contracting a debt for her own benefit, may make
it an express charge on her separate estate, and her mortgage for that pur-
pose will be supported in equity. Frary vs. Booth, 142.
14. A husband'may by his acts, as well as by express agreement, divest
himself of his marital rights in his wife's property, so as to make it her
separate estate. Id.
15. A wife left her husband in 1847. Tn 1852, property was devised to
her, which she occupied and controlled without any interference of her hus-
band until the present time. In 1857. she made a mortgage upon her estate
to secure payment of a debt for necessaries for the support of herself and
children, and in 1858 she obtained a divorce and made a second mortgage
on the same property. Held, that though as between her and the husband
the devise to her lacked the affirmative words necessary to constitute a sepa-
rate estate in the strict meaning of the terms; yet under the circumstances
it was to be considered her separate estate as between her and the first
mortgagee. d.
16. Such first mortgage may also be supported in equity on the principle
that where a married woman trades as a feme sole, or obtains credit on her
separate estate, a court of equity will hold the proceeds of the business or
the estate subject to the claims of her creditors. Id.
17. Or on the principle that the estate of a married woman living apart
from her husband is liable for her maintenance. Id.
18. The second mortgage having been made with notice of the circum-
stances, has no equity to come in before the first. Id.
1 19. The statutes of Vermont, in regard to the conveyance of married
women's estates, do not affect the jurisdiction of the courts of equity over
the subject of separate estates. fM.
20. Nature of wife's separate estate and her power to charge it, discussed.
Note to Frary vs. Booth, 158.
21. Property devised to wife, her heirs and assigns, free from control of
her husband, may be disposed of by her absolutely in fee, by will. Hall T.
Waterhouse, 754.
INDEX.
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22. Power of wife over separate estate. English chses discussed. Id.,
note.
23. Bill in equity lies to compel payment out of separate estate, of a bond
given by her for land for her separate use. And the creditor is not confined
to the collateral security on the bond. Rogers vs. Ward, 813.
24. Bill need not set out any specific estate. Id.
25. Wife's separate estate is liable for services of attorneys in suits insti-
tuted upon accounts growing out of her separate business, conducted by her
husband as agent, and for the purpose of benefiting such estate. Owen vs.
Cawley, 123.
26. Conveyance by husband to wife as her separate property, if carried
into effect, is good in equity. Cardell vs. Ryder et al., 66.
27. Judgment given by husband to wife to secure her separate estate is
valid. Williams's Appeal, 440.
28. What was necessary to charge the separate estate in New York before
the Act of 1860. While vs. Story, 440.
29. The wife had no title in her own right to her earnihgs in New York
prior to the Act of 1860, and that act does not divest the husband's title to
his wife's earnings by services performed previously to the act. Woodbeck
vs. Hewens, 121.
IV. Powers and Liabilities of Married Women. See HOMESTEAD, 3.
30. A married woman who has no separate estate cannot, as against her
husband's creditors, acquire a title to property sold as his at sheriff's sale,
by repurchase from the purchaser and giving a mortgage on the property
for the whole purchase-money. Baringer vs ,$tiver, 659.
81. Judgment confessed by wife is void, but she may agree to revive one
already legally entered. Bruner's Appeal, 254.
32. Wife may act as agent of husband, and may be appointed verbally or
otherwise. Goodwin vs. Kelly, 187.
33. Wife claiming benefits of New York Acts of 1848 and 1849 must show
that she was a resident. Savage vs. O'Niel, 380.
84. Those acts did not take away the power of husband and wife to con-
tract with each other. rd.
35. New York Acts of 1848 and 1849 construed. Improvement in value
of wife's land. Goss vs. Cahill, 264.
V. Actions by and against Husband and Wife.
36. Husband being in fact tenant and dispossessed by summary proceed-
ings for non-payment of rent, he alone should be relator in certiorari.
.People vs. McCa frey, 38.
37. On foreclosure of mortgage made by husband before marriage, the
wife need not be made party, her remedy, if any, being an action to redeem.
Smith vs. Gardner, 880.
ILLEGAL VOTING. See CnmNAL LAw, IV.
INCOME TAX. See TAXATION, 2.
INFANT. See NEGLIGENCE, 6; PARENT AND CHILD.
INNKEEPER.
1. Where a guest, in compliance with notice from the innkeeper, deposited
a sealed package in the safe, and in answer to an inquiry as to its contents,
merely said, "money;" the innkeeper held liable only for an amount suffi-
cient for travelling expenses. Wilkins vs. Earle, 742.,
2. Is liable as an insurer, for property of a guest destroyed by fire in a
barn. Hfulett vs. Swift, 187.
INSANITY. See CRIMINAL LAW, 11; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 8.
INSOLVENCY. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 1, 4; EXECUTOR, 2.
1. Discharge is a bar to recovery of damages for conversion of goods
Bickford vs. Barnard, 313.
2. In distribution of estate, a debt not yet due by insolvent cannot be
set off against one due him. Bank', Appeal, 637.
VoL. XIII.-50
INDEX.
INSURANCE. See JUDGMENT, 4.
1. When a portion of the subjects of a civil government have rebelled,
and the rebellion is of such magnitude that the military and naval forces
have been called out to suppress it, the fact that such rebels are 'obbers on
the land, and pirates on the sea, does not preclude them from being regarded
as belligerents. The Golden Rocket, 27.
2. The seizure and destruction of a merchant vessel by such rebels, on
the high seas, is within the terms of a warranty in the margin of a policy
of insurance, by which the risk of "capture, seizure, or detention," is ex-
cepted from the perils insured against. Id.
3. Taking of a vessel by a privateer under the flag of the so-called Con-
federate States, is a capture within the exception of the policy. Fifield vs.
Insurance Co., 255.
4. A transfer by one co-tenant or partner to another is within the pro-
hibition of alienation. Buckley vs. Garrett, 441.
5. But the acts of the company, as accepting premiums from the alienee,
may make a waiver of the forfeiture, and consequently an estoppel.. Id.
u. Where goods are insured for a voyage there is no implied warranty on
the part of the insurers that the goods are seaworthy. Koebel vs. Saunders,
113.
7. If a policy of insurance on a vessel expires while she is supposed to
be on a voyage, and a second policy for a different sum is taken, after the
expiration of the first, there is. in this country, no rule of law which requires
payment of that policy under which the vessel sailed, or was last heard
from, in the absence of proof of the time of loss. Clifford vs. Insurance
Co., 594.
8. It is a question of fact for the jury to determine wihen a presumption
of loss arises. So, also, in case of loss, the time it. occurred. Id.
9, Time policy on vesel-extension clause-port of destination. Wales
vs. In.s. Co., 313.
10. Verbal contract to make out policy -intervening loss-evidence.
Audubon vs. Excelsior Co., 187.
11. Amount of valued policy at extraordinary rate recovered, notwith-
standing it greatly exceeded the actual loss. Delano vs. Am. Insurance
Co., 124.
12. Insurable interest-construction of statements as to title, made on
the application for insurance-parol contradiction of the application-ter-
mination of insurable interest under agreement to purchase. Birmingham
vs. Ins. Co., 314.
13. Suit on premium note-by law in violation of the charter passed after
a member joins-presumption of acquiescence. Ins. Co. vs. Harvey, 508.
INTEREST. See CONTRACT, 7; MOioTGAGE, 12; Usury.
Vendee evicted under prior mortgage, is entitled only to interest in the
purchase-money from the date of the master's deed. Ohling vs. Luitjens,
441.
INTERNATIONAL LAW. See INSURANCE, 1-8.
L Belligerent Rights and Duties.
1. The sale of a vessel of war by a belligerent to a neutral dtiring hos-
tilities is not valid as against the other belligerent. The United States vs.
The Schooner -Etta, 38.2. The doctrine of belligerent rights gives no power to the enemy to take
with impunity the property of a citizen of an invaded country. Lucas vs.
Bruce et al., 95.
3. The rebel army, during their occupation of a portion of the United
States, were mere trespassers. Id.
4. Thereforethe order of a commander of such army, is no defence to a
party .in an action for taking a third person's goods. Id.
5. Such commander and the person taking in obedience to his orders are
joint trespassers. Id.
6. The compulsion that will excuse a trespass must have been an actual
force upon the person, and must hove contiiuad all the time. Id.
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7. The statement in plaintiff's declaration, that he was about to use his
property for an unlawful and treasonable purpose, is not a defence in an
action against defendant for taking such property and applying it to "the
same purpose. Lucas vs. Bruce, et at., 95.
8. Where property is taken by a trespasser, and while in his possession
is destroyed, under such circumstances that it is a matter of doubt whether
it would have been destroyed had it remained in the possession of the right-
ful owner, the trespasser is liable for the full value. Id.
9. In a country held by military force the authority of the occupying
force is paramount, and excludes all other independent authority in it: U.
8. vs. Reiter, 534.
10. Government from some source is a necessity, and while the power is
exclusively with a party occupying a country, the right and duty are his to
supply that want. Id.
11. The establishment of the Provisional Court for Louisiana, by the
President, as Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the United States, while
they held the territory in which it was to exercise its functions, was an act
warranted by the law of nations. Id.
II. Blockade.
12. Blockade may be by batteries on shore. The Circassian. 602.
18. A public blockade is presumed to continue until notification by the
government that it is ended, and it does not cease by the occupation of the
port by the blockading force. Id.
14. Vessel sailing with intent to break blockade is liable as prize from
the moment of sailing, notwithstanding an intent to call at a neutral port
on the way. Id.
15. Evidence of intent to break blockade. Id.
IIl. Status of Persons in Hostile Territor.
16. The personal disposition of residents in enemy's territory cannot be
inquired into on a question of prize. Alexander's Cotton, 576.
17. This applies to civil as well as foreign wars, unless modified by the
action of the government itself. Id.
]8. The United States, by the Act 12 March 1863, does make a aistinction
between loyal persons and others whom the general rule would class together
as enemies. Id.
19. Cotton was a proper subject of capture by the United States during
the rebellion. Id.
JUDGMENT. See AFFIDAVIT oF DEFENCE, 1; AGENT, 3; ATTORNEY, 1; ERRoR,
2; HusBAND AND WIF., 27, 31.- ,
1. Conclusiveness of foreign judgments, discussed. 7.
2. Queere, if an attorney can assign a judgment after payment. He cannot
assign it to one who pays on compulsion, in derogation of his client's rights.
De Cou's Appeal, 315.
3. Bail for stay of execution on a judgment for ground-rent, who pays and
obtains an assignment of the judgment, does not obtain priority over a judg-
ment for arrears subsequently accrued. Id.
4. For want of plea in an action on a valued policy of insurance is final,
and a lien, though damages are not assessed. Sellers vs. Burk, 441.
5. Judgment signed in firm name, but first names of partners not set out
on index, is not a lien against subsequent purchasers or lien-creditors.
,Smith's Appeal, 255.
6. Actual notice to the purchaser would supply the defective registry. Id.
7. Mere notice of a judgment ten years old will not affect a purchaser of
tle debtor's land without actual fraudulent intent. Rejnolds vs. Darling,
382.
8. Evidence on trial of scirefacias to revive. ilenry vs. Brothers, 638.
9. Assignment of judgment on record is not constructive notice to debtor.
Id.
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JURY. See Cou Ts, 3: TRIAL, 2.
Sufficient, cause for challenge. People vs. Holt, 574.
4USTICE OF THE PEACE.
Surety liable for money collected without suit. Ditmars vs. Com., 442.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See HUSBAND AND WIFE. 86.
1. Notice to quit by two of three joint lessors will not enable the three to
maintain summary proceedings for possession, nor will subsequent ratifica-
tion by the third lessor be equivalent to a prior authority. Pickard vs.
Perley. 442.
2. Covenant by landlord to renew lease, does not give tenant a right of
possession. Finney vs Cist, 119.
3. Rent under a written lease not recoverable on count for use, &c.
Warren vs Ferdinand, 765.
4. Clause in lease as to reasonable wear and tear. Ball vs. Wyeth, 187.
5. A. agreed to pay B. 12s. a week for the use of standing-room and
steam-power for certain machinery belonging to A., in a room the property
of B., and to which B. had access to oil the machinery. B., in the absence
of A.. who had locked his room, unfastened the window, entered, and dis-
trained the machines for rent; the distraint was unlawful, and trover lay
for the conversion of the machines. Hancock vs. Austin, 110.
6. Waiver of exemption as to distress on all property on the premises,
does not extend to the debt for the rent. Mitchel vs. Coates, 442.
LARCENY. See CRIXINAL LAw, 12.
LEGACY. See WILL. 6.
Bequest of a sum "less any legal debt" due to testator's estate, is payable
without deduction to a daughter who had signed notes with her husband for
money advanced to him by testator. Rogers vs. Daniell, 116.
LEGISLATURE. See CONSTITUTINAL LAw, V. ; HusBAND AND WIFE, 5; M NVI-
CIPAL CORPORATION, 14.
LIEN. See JUDGMENT, 5; MORTGAGE, 20, 30; TENDER; VENDOR AND VENDEE,
10. .
Equitable liens may be created by express agreement but not by implica-
tion ; and they will be divested by sheriff's sale except in special cases.
Hiester vs. Green, 639.
LIMITATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 24; EQUITY, 1; EXECUTOR, 1, 2;
TnUST, 1, 2.
1. Lex fori determines the period. although both parties are citizens of
another state. Power vs. Hathawayj, 765.
2. Statute is a bar in Surrogate's Court as in others, and where there is
concurrent jurisdiction with a court of law, the legal period will constitute
a bar. Smith vs. Remington. 122.
3. Statute must be pleaded. Heath -is. Page, 639.
4. Satisfaction of mortgage on condition of receiving other security pay-
able in ten years is not such payment of the debt as allows the statute to
run. Id.
5. Payment by one of joint debtors. Hawley vs. Griswold, 188.
6. Defendant not entitled to a conveyance setting up title cannot affect
plaintiff till the latter has distinct knowledge of the adverse claim. Robinson
vs. Sherwin, 674.
7. Judgment by default. against a debtor sued as trustee or garnishee is
not such acknowledgment of the debt as will take it out of the statute.
Goodwin vs. Buzzell, 56.
8. Nor is a conditional promise to pay it sufficient. rd.
9. Acknowledgment to avoid the statute must be clear, but may be made
more than six years after the original cause of action accrued. Yaw vs.
Kerr, 443.
10. The action must be on the original undertaking. Id.
11. Act runs ag ainst claim for professional services, though the relation
INDEX. /
LIMITATION.
of client and attorney continues as to other matters. Hae'a Ez'ra. vs. Ard,
638.
12. Agreement by creditor to extend time of redemption of land mort-
gaged for security of his debt does not extend the personal liability of the
debtor. Ball vs. Wyeth, 185.
13. Omission to disclose a trespass on land to the owner will not prevent
the running of the statute. .Ndd vs. Hamblin, 118.
LOUISIANA PROVISIONAL COURT, 385, 534.
LOUISIANA PROVISIONAL JUDICIARY, 257.
LUNATIC. See CRIMISAL LAw, 11; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 8.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
1. Probable cause, as a defence in an action for malicious prosecution, is
a reasonable ground of suspicion, supporied by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person
accused was guilty of the offence charged. Ross vs. Inness, 281.
2. A want of probable cause cannot be inferred from malice, though
malice may be inferred from want of probable cause. In an action the
burden is on- the plaintiff to show affirmatively, by circumstances or other-
wise, that the defendant had no ground for'the prosecution. Id.
8. That the defendant acted under advice of counsel cannot avail, unless
there was a full statement of all the facts to the advising counsel, nor unless
the arrest was made in consequence of such advice, and not in pursuance of
a previous fixed determination to make such arrest. Id.
4. Evidence that the prosecution was to obtain poscession of goods is
proof of want of probable cause. Schofield vs. Perrers, 443.
5. Want of cause is not malice but evidence of it. Id.
6. Record of replevin for the property alleged to have been stolen is not
admissible. Id.
MANDAMUS. See MUNxcIPA CORPORATION, 8.
1. Peremptory writ may issue in first instance. People vs. Contracting
Board, 188.
2. Appropriate remedy to compel admission to membership of medical
society. People vs. Medical Soc., 575.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See BAILMZNT; NZGLIGENCR, 9.
Responsibility of master for servant's negligence, 140.
MILITARY COMMISSION. See CouaTs, 8.
MINES. See CovicNANT 4
MISSOURL CAsE OF TOR SuPREE CouRT, 705.
MONEY. See CUnnRxor.
MORTGAGE. See HUSBAND AND Wir, 13-18, 80, 3; LIITATION, 4; TaN-
DER; VFENDOR AND VENDER, 1, 4.
I. Of the Making of a Mortgage.
1. A deed absolute on its face if meant only for security is a mortgage.
HcBurney vs. Wellman, 382.
2. The Statute of Frauds will not prevent the party aggrieved from show-
ing the true nature of the transaction. Id.
3. A., being indebted to B. for illegal consideration, gives a mortgage to
B.'s creditor, C., who has knowledge of the illegality-the mortgage it void.
Baker vs. Collins, 505.
4. To secure liabilities already incurred but not specifying the amount,
is good. roung vs. Wilson, 188.
5. A mortgage by a company after entry on land authorized to be taken
for their use, and before judgment for damages, would bind their equitable
interest. Borough of .aton's Appeal, 811.
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6, Equitable mortgage raised by assignment of legal mortgage security
after payment. Peckham vs. Hdduck, 506.
7. Lez loci governq though 'both parties reside in another state. God-
dard vs. atcyer, 765.
II. Of the Rights of Parties and Purchasers.
8. Mortgagee who hasbeen fraudulently induced to give up his mortgage
for other securities, may have an action to foreclose against a purchaser from
the mortgagor. Grimes vs. Kimball, 118.
9. To avoid a mortgage for fraud towards creditors, the intent in the
mortgagee as well as the mortgagor must be shown-what may be evidence
in such cases. Carpenter vs. Muren, 255.
10. Mortgagee assigning the mortgage and then purchasing the mortgaged
premises, takes them subject to the mortgage-over-payments made by him
may be recovered back. Thompson vs. Otis, 815.
11. If the mortgage authorizee payment of the expenses of the mortgagee,
a court of equity may pay costs and counsel fees out of the funds in its
hands. Bronson vs. R. R. Ca., 767.
12. Mortgagee refusing tender not entitled to interest, and liable for costs
on bill to redeem. Brown vs. Simons, 50&
18. Purchaser of a portion of the land from mortgagor entitled to make
tender of the amount of the mortgage and hold a lien on the rest of the
land, but not to have counsel fees or costs as against subsequent pur-
chasers. I'd.
14. Mortgagee may release a portion of the land without impairing his
lien on the rest unless he has notice of a right iix the other part to exemp-
tion; and the record of subsequent conveyanpe is not such notice. George
vs. Wood, 765.
15. In a bill to redeem, the right to contribution from a grantee cannot
be settled unless he is party. ."d.
16. Mortgagee disseised cannot assign. Dadmunn vs. Lamson, 765.
17. Purchaser of mortgaged premises haying an 9pprtunity to defend as
terre t nant, cannot afterwards dispute the amount. Schneyf's Appeal, 189.
18. Sale is void ai to a purchaser not 1arty to the foreclosure. Ohling vs.
Luijep, 443.
19. Mortgagor may demand a just accoirnt of amount due, and if account
not correct, may tender the true amount or may file a bill to settle the
amount; but an evident mistake in footing the account when the Items are
correct will not- vitiate it. Currier ye. Webstar, 443.
20. Though only a lien in equity, it ripens into a title on. foreclosure.
Smith vs. Gardner, 381.
fli. Of the remedy.
23. Power of sale may be executed after mortgagor's death. Varnum vs.
eserve, 188.
22. Mortgagee of personal property may adjourn the sale without new
'notice to mortgagor. HosmerT s. Sargent, 119.
23. In suit to foreclose, the mortgagor is entitled to the statute penalty
for usury in reduction of the judgment. Minot -s. Sawyer, 11[9..
24. But only f9r pa.ury qnder e written contraot., .d.
25. If mortgagor performs lator in payment, the de-ft remains until the
_.ettq Ppplication of. hp lfges .Phe discharge,; and if such application
has not been made, mortgagor may have bill to redeem. Doody vs. Pierce,
"2g. Plrtis and j'pqee4ings in bill to ?edeem. Id.
IV. Of Indemnity and to secure Future Indebtedness.
:, 27. To indemnify against loss froma fture liability, Is valid. Goddard
vs. Sawyer, 765.
' 28. -t personalty to sdeurefuture indebtedness not valid against a judg-
'laent-oreditor of mortgagor for claims acciuing after his suit. Barnard vs.
Moore, 116.
INDEX.,
MORTGAGE.
V. Chattel Mortgage.
29. To secure future debts not valid against a judgment-creditoi. Bar-
nard vs. Moore, 315.
30. Continuance of lien after removal of property to another state. Cobb
vs. Buswell, 252.
31. If property 1s in posseision of third person, immediat6 delivery not
necessary. doodwin vs. Kelly, 188.
32. Case of application of the rule. Id.
MUNICIPAL BONDS.
1. A county issuing bonds under authority of an act of legislature,
referred to on the face of the bonds, is bound to pay them in the hands of
bonia fide holders for value, without regard to the restrictions to their issue,
in the statute. Mercer Co. vs. Hacket, d-c., 114.
2. Bonds payable to bearer, though under seal, are negotiable instru-
ments Id., 115.
3. If sold below par. in violation of the statute authorizing their issue,
the county may compel the holder to receive in satisfaction the amount paid
by first purchaser with interest. County vs. Brinton, 444.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 21; HwaonAX; NEo-
LIGENCE, 13, 17.
1. The line of low water is the boundary line, and the jurisdiction of the
city follows the shore as it advances into the river. Luke vs. Brooklyn, 444.
2. Courts will not prevent the extension of boundaries, but will restrain
taxation within the line where it ceases to be beneficial to the proprietor in
a municipal point of view. Fulton vs. Davenport, 444.
3. When property near a city becomes taxable by it. Id.
4. Conveyance of land bounded by a street on the water's edge-accretions
to the shore--dedication to public use. Banks vs. Ogden, 509.
5. Ordinance prohibiting the running of swine valid. Com. vs. Curts,
509.
6. Ordinance must follow the charter strictly, or a contract under it will
be void, and the contractor in such case cannot recover in any form of action.
Cowen vs. West Troy,, 510.
7. Statute authorizing subscription to company for making a road or roads
to a city, authorizes subscription for a road between two other cities, from
one of which there is a road to the subscribing city. Van Hostru vs. Madison
City, 115.
8. One using a wharf cannot resist payment of wharfage on the ground
that it was not properly built, though a mandamus might lie to compel the
borough to provide proper facilities, or an injunction to prevent taking
wharfage until the wharf be properly built. Prescott vs. Borough of Du-
quene, 640.
9, Where suit is brought in the name of an individual for the use of a
borough, and on trial, his name is stricken off, he is a competent witness.
Id.
10. In a grant "to the inhabitants of a town, to be held by them as a
body politic and corporate, and to their successors for ever," the title vests
in the town as a corporation. .New XAarket.vs. Smart, 890.
11. In the case of such grpmt made in 1803, to the use of the minister
then settled in the town of New Market, as long as he should be the settled
Congregational minister there; and thena to be and, remain for the use of the
minister of that persuasion that shall be settled in that town, the title vests
in the town in its parochial, and not in its municipal character. Id.
12. Where the voltmitary religious society over which the minister referred
to was settled, afterwards became a body corporate, and the town was no
longer charged with any parochial duties in relation to such society,; tke
legal, as well as beneficial, estate in the lands so granted, passed to that
society, as the successor to the parochial rights and duties formerly belong-
ing to the town. .d.
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13. Town has no right to money improperly collected by tax from its tax-
payers. Gailor vs. Herrick, 122.
14. An act appointing commissioners to erect public buildings, &c., for a
city does not authorize them to bind the city without the latter's assent to
the act. Van Valkenburgh vs. New York, 437.
15. City is not liable for money borrowed and converted by its treasurer
in its name, though it had authorized him to borrow money for a specific
purpose, and he had done so. Lowell Savings Bank vs. Tinchecter, 119.
NEGLIGENCE. See ATTACHMENT; BAILMENT; COMMON CARRIER, 3; DOMESTIC
ANIMALS; HIGHWAY; PHYSICIANS, 1-4; RAILROADS, 1, 8; SELT-DE.EN OE, 3, 4.
1. Where a passenger on a car or vessel is injured by the concurrent
negligence of his carrier and a third person, his remedy is solely against
his carrier. Lockhart et al. vs. Lichtenthaler, 15.
2. If, however, the negligence of the third party was the sole proximate
cause of the injury, and there was negligence of the carrier only in a general
sense, but which did not contribute to the injury, the third party is respon-
sible. Id.
3. Whether the defence of concurrent negligence can be heard without
being specially pleaded, gutre. Id.
4. Estoppel of party by his carrier's negligence, discussed. Note to Lock-
hart vs. Lichtenthaler, 23.
5. Sending child two years and a half old across a street without an
attendant, is negligence. Callahan vs. Bean, 445.
6. Riding on platform of horse-car is not such negligence that the court
will prevent a recovery. Heesel vs. L. t" B. R. R. Co., 189.
7. Crossing railroad track without looking if a train is coming, is not
conclusive evidence of negligence in plaintiff. Circumstances under which
the company held liable. Warren vs. R. R. Co., 316.
8. In proving character of plaintiff's horse, instances being proved of his
shying before the accident, similar instances after it may be proved. Todd
vs. Rowley, 119.
9. Builders not liable for injury to a workman through negligence of the
foreman. Gallagher vs. Piper, 816.
10. Persons -performing public duty gratuitously and taking no personal
part in the work are not liable for negligence of those employed by them.
Cox vs. Wise, 316.
11. Railroad company liable for injury to a servant caused by defective
road-bed. Snow vs. Housatonic R. R. Co., 316.
12. Corporation liable for tort in keeping vicious dog, but 8cienter must be
proved as to some person having charge. Stiles vs. Cardiff Co., 315.
13. City not liable for failure to keep a sewer in repair whereby water
flowed into a house not connected with the sewer. Barry vs. Lowell, 119.
14. Action for escape of gas-evidence. Hiint vs. Lowell Co., 119.
15. Party makinig abstract of title liable for mistakes. Clark vs. Marshall,
120.
16. Trustees of a railroad under a mortgage, who operate the road, are
personally liable for negligence of employees. Ballou vs. Farnum, 766.
17. Owner of a building partially leased out, liable to city for damages
the latter had to pay on account of defective awning, if he had notice of the
suit, and such suit is conclusive on him. Afiord vs. Holbrook, 766.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. See Mu ziscrAL Bons, 2.
1. Indorsement ot negotiable paper "for collection" restrains its negotia-
bility. Sweeney vs. Easter, 115.
Holders are presumed to be bond fide and for value. Bronson vs. La
Crosse, 1c., R. R. Co., 767.
NEW TRIAL. See EQuiry, 16.
1. Will not be granted for newly-discovered evidence merely cumulative
or where there is laches or after judgment. Shedon vs. Stryker, 256.
2. Judge's commentaries on evidence are not the subject of exception,
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nor is his omission to notice a portion of it, unless specially requested to
charge on it. Powell vs. Jones, 189.
a. New testimony to prove testimony already given to be untrue, is not
cumulative. Id.
4. Supreme Court of Vermont may grant. Northfield Bank vs. Brown, 256.
NOTICE. See EQUITY, 13; JUDGMENT, 6, 7, 9; VENDOR AND VENDEE, 6.
1. The record of a deed in one town is not constructive notice of the con-
veyance of land in another town. .Perrin vs. Reeds, 55.
2. But if one sees such record, this constitutes notice. Id.
3. An attaching creditor of real estate with notice, either actual or con-
structive, of the true state of the debtor's title, is bound by such notice. Id.
4. Notice to appear at taking of depositions before A. at a certain time
and place, dbposition taken at the appointed time and place before B. not
admissible. .Henry vs. Huntley, 253.
OFFICER. See CORpORATION, 6; ELECrONs, 1, 2; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 15;
Quo WAURANTO.
1. Removal of incumbent by appointment of new one. ,Stadler vs. Detroit,
574.
2. Quo Warranto after entry is proper remedy against action of officers
illegally appointed. *Bill in equity before entry will not lie. Updegraph vs.
Crane, 266.
PARENT AND CHILD. See NEoLIOENC, 5.
How far the father is entitled to the custody of infant child, 136.
PARTITION.
Bill to correct after thirteen years is too late. Hathaway vs. nayer, 317.
PARTNERSHIP. See AccoRD; INSURANCE, 4; JUDGMENT, 5; SHERIFF, 7.
1. Power of partner to make assignment.for benefit of creditors. Hook
vs. ,Stone, 120.
2. Assignment for benefit of creditors by two members of a firm while the
other two are out of the country, is not valid. Coope vs. Bowles, 122.
3. But assignee is allowed credit for payments in good faith, before the
action to set aside the assignment. Id.
4. Where one partner is made sole agent and manages the business
entirely by himself, the relation becomes fiduciary. Brooks vs. Martin, 574.
5. A party is liable for a tort committed by his copartner in connection
with the general object of the firm. Lua vs. Bruce, 95.
6. One of three partners overdrawing his share is liable to others jointly,
but not to one of them alone, though he be assignee of the others. Wiggins
vs. *Cummings, 817.
7. Liability to'accept bills drawn by partners, guoad certain transactions.
Nicholson vs. Ricketts, 817.
8. A bill for account by one partner after termination of partnorsbip
makes all the parties actors, and all their claims among themselves should
be settled on it. Raymond vs. Came, 445.
9. After the. contract of partnership has been carried out, the partner
holding the profits cannot refuse to account because the operations we6re
against public policy. Brooks vs. M[artin, 574.
PARTY TO RECORD. See DEED, 4; EQUITY, 12; EvIDENOEc,2.
PATENT.
1. Is not an odious monopoly, and is to receive a liberal construction.
Construction of "claim." Durrill vs. B. B. Co., 115.
2. Patent for a combination of distinct parts is not infringed by a combi-
nation omitting one part and substituting a substantially different one.
Eames vs. Godfrey, 116.
8. Patent for a machine is for it, not for its "mode of operation"' or
"idea." Burr vs. Duryea, 116.
4. Claim for "any mode of combining" certain. devices, not good. Case
vs. Brown, 575.
5. For chemical process valid, though the article producedt wis known
before. Young vs. Fernie, 817.
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PHYSICIANS.
1. The law does not imply. on the part of the physician, an undertaking
to use the highest, but only' reasonable, professional skill. Braunberger vs.
Cleis, 687.
2. What is reasonable care and skill must be determined in each case from
the circumstances. Id.
3. The words "unlawful violence or negligence,.' in the statute giving an
action to surviving relatives for an injury causing death, include malpractice
as a physician. Id.
4. But the malpractice must be such as caused the death. Mere malprac-
tice, however gross, if not the proximate cause of the death, will not sup-
port this action. rd.
5. The measure of damages is the pecuniary loss of the plaintiff. Id.
6. Membership of Medical Society--non-conformance with rules before
membership. People vs. Med. Soc., 575.
PLEADING. See NEoLIG CE, 3.
1. Each count must disclose a distinct right of action. Simmons vs. Fair-
child, 381.
2. Complaints should consist of allegations of fact. Id.
PRACTICE. See BILLS OF EXCEPTION; COSTS: COURTS; CRIIINAL LAW, 1-3;
EquiTy, 10-16; NEw TRIAL; NOTICE; TRIAL; WITNESS.
PRIZE. See INTERNATIONAL LAW, 14, 16, 19.
Property captured on land by the officers and crews of a naval force is
not "maritime prize." Alexanders Cotton, 576.
PROCESS. See AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENCE, 2; CRIMINAL LAW, I.
PUBLIC POLICY. See CONTRACT, 25; PARTNERSHIP, 9.
QUI TAM ACTION. See FRAUiDULENT AGREEMENT, 1, 2.
QUO WARRANTO. See OFFICER, 2.
Will not issue concerning a private office. Ez parte Smith, 317.
RAILROAD. See COMMON CARRIER: DAMAGES, 5; NEOLIGENCE, 6, 7, 11, 16.
1. May by contract exempt itself from liability for loss of goods by negli-
gence. Lee vs. M[arsh, 445.
2. The benefits of a statute requiring the whistle to be blown at a crossing
are not confined to person about to cross. ]Vakefield vs. Railroad Co., 256,
381.
3. The omission to blow the whistle is not conclusive evidence of negli.
gence. Id.
4. Street railroad company is not taxable for horses used in its business.
Middlesex Co. vs. Charleatown, 117.
REBELLION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, I.; L-xSbRANCE, 1-3; INTERNATIONAL
LAW; PRIZE.
RECEIVER. See ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS, 3.
RECORD. See NOTICE, 1, 2.
RELIGIOUS SOCIETY. See CORPORA.TioN, 20, 21; MuN cIPAL CoRPoRAIoN,
10-12.
REPLEVIN. See CONTRACT, 14; STOPPAGE Ix TRANSITU, 4.
1. Writ need not state value of goods. Pomero vs. Trimper, 318.
2. What is not a defence to the action. Id.
3. Judgment being for damages only, the sheriff is not liable by reason
of failure to justify of sureties for delivery of the property. Gallarati vs.
Orser, 190.
SALE. See VENDOR AND VENDEE.
SECURITY. See BILLS AND NOTES, 1, 7.
Holder of notes as collateral is a trustee of an express trust, and suit is
properly brought in his name. Clark vs. 2Tcomb& 124.
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SELF-DEFENCE.
1. A man assaulted under such circumstances as to authorize a reasonable
belief of a design to take his life, or inflict extreme bodily injury, will be
justified if he kill his assailant. Mor-is vs. .Platt, 628.
2. The question whether the belief was reasonable or not is for a jury,
but a person does not act in such a case at the peril of making that guilt, if
appearances prove false, which would be innocence if they proved true. rd.
8. A man is not liable in trespass on the case, for an unintentional con-
sequential injury resulting from a lawful act, where neither negligence nor
folly can be imputed to him; and there is no reason for P, different rule
where the injury is immediate and direct, and the action trespass. Id.
4. Where a person in lawful self-defence fires a pistol at an assailant, and
missing him wounds an innocent bystander, he is not liable for the injury
if guilty of no negligence. Td.
SET-OFF.* See ATTORNEY; FORmER REcOVEnY, 4; I sOLVENcY, 2.
There may be a set-off to a set-off. Galligan vs. Faunder, 510.
SHERIFF. See REPLEVIN, 3.
1. A sheriff is liable for the escape of a prisoner, committed to his cus-
tody on final process in a civil action, pnless it takes place through the act
of God, or of a public enemy, or through the act of the law. Vilckens vs.
Willet, 404.
2. It will be a sufficient defence to show that such prisoner was taken
from his custody, and retained by the sergeant-at-arms of the House of
Representatives of the United States, by means of a warrant issued by the
House in due form of law, to cause the prisoner to be brought before it to
answer for an alleged contempt. Id.
3. The proceeding on such a warrant is an "act of the law." Id.
4. It seems, that if the prisoner had left the jail liberties in obedience to
the subpcena, and had not been arrested on a warrant to answer for an
alleged contempt, the sheriff would have been liable. Id.
5. Recovery agaiust for an escape. Matter of Chamberlain, 818.
6. Must take property under an attachment, into his actual custody.
Smith vs. Orser, 768.
7. Levy on partnership property-action against sheriff. Id.
SHERIFF'S DEED. See LEN.
1. Relates back to time of sale, and may be made to purchaser's adminis-
trator. Reynolds vs. Darling, 382.
2. Qualification where rights of third persons intervene. Id.
SHIP BROKER.
Does not earn commissions by merely introducing the customer to the
seller, but he may prove a custom which will entitle him. Cook vs. Wjelch,
446.
SHIPPING.
1. Freight paid and not earned may be recovered back. Chase vs. Ins.
Co., 446.
2. If charter-party made in Scotland, the right to recover would depend
on Scotch law. which on a question of commercial law will be presumed to
be like our own. Id.
SOCIETY. See ConoR.TioN, 20, 21; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 10-12.
STAMP. See CONSrsTuTIONA LAw, 19; DEEU, 5.
1. Draft not stamped being considered void, suit was brought on original
contract. On trial after the act of 30th June, 1864, the draft was produced
and stamped. Hild, the draft was thereby made valid, and plaintiff could
not recover. Oibson vs. Hibbard, 571.
2. If original writ is stamped, depositions under it need not be. Cardell
vs. .Bridge, 447.
STATE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
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STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.
1. Where goods are sold to a vendee transacting business at the same
place witli a vendor, and no transit of the goods is contemplated between
the parties, and, by the contract of sale, the goods are to be delivered at
fixed dates on the receipt of the vendee's notes, on the delivery of the notes,
the right of stoppage in transitu does not exist. Holbrook vs. Vose, 602.
2. Where goods are in bond for duties, they may be sold subject to the
lien of the United States. If the vendor consents to a withdrawal for tran-
shipment, and the vendee executes the customary bond for that purpose, the
right of stoppage in transitu can no longer be exercised by the vendor. Id.
3. Even assuming that the right of stoppage in transitu continued as
between the vendor and the vendee, it is lost if the vendee assigns to an
honest purchaser a bill of lading of the goods given to himself on his own
transhipment. 4d.
4. If vendor retakes the goods improperly by replevin he may be treated
as a trespasser, and so it seems may his sureties in the replevin bond. Id.
STREAM.
Riparian proprietor may increase volume of water by drainage, but cannot
by an artificial channel drain off water standing on his own land upon that
of another. Miller vs. Laubach, 318.
SUMMONS. See CRI1IDNAL LAw, 2.
SUNDAY. See WILL, 13.
Services performed on week-days in accordance with request in a letter
written on Sunday, may be recovered for. Tuckerman vs. Hinkley, 764.
SURETY. See BILLS AND NOTES, 4, 5; CoiroRATioN, 6, 7; JUSTICE OF THE
PEACE; STOPPAGE IN TRANSITu, 4.
1. P., a commission merchant, being in arrears to his consignors, on their
requisition procured defendant as security. The bond did not recite that P.
was at the time in arrears; and it was held by a majority of the court that
the omission to state this fact was evidence of fraud to go to the jury. Lee
vs. Jones, 487.
2. Bond signed on condition that it should be signed by a certain person
as co-surety is void without his signature. People vs. Bostiwick. 503.
3. Erasure of name of a signer of a bond to the government, though before
approval and acceptance. discharges a subsequent signer. Smith vs. U. S, f11.
4. Creditor is entitled to the benefit of any security his debtor may have
given his surety. Rankin vs. Wilsey, 447.
6. But if surety acquires title the -pledge may be merged. Id.
6. Discharge of principal does not discharge surety of person not suijuris.
Jones vs. Crosthwaite, 447.
TAXATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 25, 32-6, 39; MusIcipAL ConroRA-
TION, 2, 3, 13; RAILROAD, 4.
1. Remedies of person whose property is seized for a void or erroneous
tax. Maclot vs. Davenport, 447.
2. Income tax due from the estate on which it was assessed, though it
was a life estate and tenant died before the end of the year. Holmes vs.
Taber, 512.
TELEGRAPHS AND TELEGRAMS. THE LAW or, 193.
TENANT IN COMMON. See INSURANCE, 4.
TENDER. See MORTGAGE, 12, 13, 19; VENDOR AND VENDEE, 7.
Lien of mortgage is discharged by tender and refusal after the mortgage
is due and before foreclosure. Van Husan vs. Kanouse, 676.
TIME. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 28, 31; CONTRACT, 9-11, 20; Ixsu.U&NCE, 7.
8; LIMITATION, 12.
Rule as to computation of, discussed. Note to Opinion, ic., 222.
TORT. See NEGLIGENCE, 1, 2; PARTNERSHIP, 5.
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TRESPASS. See DAMAGES, 2-4; EQUITY, 1-6; INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2-8; Siar.
DErENoE, 8; STOPPAOE IN TRANsITU, 4.
TRESPASS ON THE CASE. See SELT-DzrzNCz, 8.
TRIAL.
1. It is not the proper course for a judge -to lay down the general prin-
ciples applicable to a case and leave the jury to apply them, but it is his
duty to inform the jury what the law is as applicable to the facts of the
case. Morris vs. Platt, 523.
2. The facts of a case are to be found by the jury, unless admitted, and
the judge can only regard them as claimed, for the purpose of appliing the
law to them contingently, if found; and he cannot properly refuse to charge
upon the facts claimed on the ground that in his opinion they are not
proved. Id.
3. Control -of the court over disparaging questions. Turnpike Co. vs-
Loomis, 575.
4. Raising questions of law at the circuit by motion to strike out the
defendant's answer, is contrary to the New York Code. The question
should be presented either by a proper motion before the trial or by de-
murrer. Smith vs. Countryman, 102.
TROVER. See CONTRACT, 12; DAmAGEs, 4; INsTvENCY, 1; LANDLORD AND
TENANT, 5.
Purchasing a horse from one who had no right to sell him and hiring him
to another person, is a conversion. Gilmore vs. Newton, 512.
TRUST. See CHARITABLE USES; EQUITY, 8, 15; PARTNEasmP, 4; SECURITY.
1. Where the cestui gua trust in possession disavows the trust, and claims
to hold the land by a title hostile to that of the trustee; and this is distinctly
brought to the knowledge of the trustee, the possession will from that time
be adverse. New Market vs. Smart, 890.
2. In such a case it is not essential that the ceitui qua trust should claim
an absolute fee simple or freehold in himself, but it is sufficient if the title
claimed be in trust for the use of the ministry in a certain religious society
for ever. Id.
8. Devise to trustee to collect rents and pay over to ceetul qus trust with-
out being subject to his liabilities, is an operative trust. Shankland'a
Appeal, 820.
UNINCORPORATED SOCIETIES. See Con vuAOsi, 20.
UNITED STATES NOTES AND LOANS. See CoNsTITuIoA. LAW, IL
USURY. See MORTGAoz, 23, 24.
1. Subject discussed, 321, 512.
2. Rate fixed by law per annum, may be paid at periods shorter than a
year, although the effect is to give compound interest. Meyer vs. Muscat ine,
116.
3. Interest may be contracted to be paid either at the plao of contract
or place of performance, without being usurious unless so contraottd for
the purpose of getting the higher rate. Miller vs. Tiffany, 116.
4. Promise to pay a sum above legal interest, depending on a contingency
is not usurious. iSpain vs. Hamilton's Af , 116.
VENDOR AND VENDEE. See AssIGNMENT PoR BuiexriT or CAZDITORS, 1;
CONTRACT, 16-19; INTEREST; JUDGMENT, 5-7.
I. Of Real Estate.
1. Where suit is brought by vendee to enforce an agreemer.4 for the sale
of land, on a mortgage for two years, and there is no allegation that the
vendee's circumstances have changed since the making of the agreement,
evidence is not admissible to show that the contemplated use of the land
will destroy its value within two years, and that the mortgagor is otherwise
unable to pay. Coron vs. ulany, 478.
2. An agreement for the purchase of land at the option of Tendee, is
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not, after election by vendee and notice to vendor, so devoid of mutuality
that it will not be enforced. Corson TB. Hulvany, 478.
8. Nor does the refusal of vehdor to accept the consideration, destroy
the mutuality, though it. gives the vendee an opportunity to retract his
election. Id.
4. The refusal of vendor's wife to join in the conveyance, and the con-
sequent inability of vendee to give a mortgage on the unincumbered fee
simple, does not permit vendor to withdraw from his agreement, if vendee
waives the release of dower. Id.
5. The grant of equity powers to the courts of Pennsylvania does not
interfere with their jurisdiction to enforce performance of such an agree-
ment in an ejectment at common law. Id.
6. After decree for completion of executory contract for purchase of
land, at suit of vendee's executor, it is too late for vendor to allege want of
notice of the taking of testimony. Thompson vs. McKinley, 447.
7. Vendee, on refusal of tender of purchase-money, may pay it into Court,
and will not be liable for interest. Id.
8. Vendee may have action for fraudulent representations as to the boun-
daries of his lot. Newell vs. Horn, 448.
9. Vendee under articles mortgaged the laud, and afterwards he and
vendor rescinded their contract and vendor sold to another-rights of the
parties. Alden vs. Garver, 448.
10. Vendor's lien is only waived by express agreement, or by taking col-
lateral security; the party disputing the lien has the burden of proof. Du-
bois vs. Hull, 511.
11. Purchaser of real estate with warranty cannot detain purcbase-money
if his knowledge and the state of facts continue the same as they were at
the date of purchase. Wilson vs. Cochran, 640.
II. Of Personalty. See STOPPAGE in TRAlsru.
12. Time the title passes, 138.
13. Bill of sale of all the interest of one partner in partnership property
passes title to money not included in the schedule. Cram vs. Bank, 807.
14. If a bill of sale of goods described as marked A, &c., includes all
vendor has on hand, the title passes; otherwise, not till a separation is
made. Ropes vs. Lane, 446.
15. Sale and constructive delivery to agent of two purchasers passes the
title as against a third purcbaser. Id.
16. Mere omission of vendor to give information of defects is not fraud.
McDonald vs. Christie, 191.
17. Where purchaser of a chattel in an action for the price sets up fraud
of vendor but withdraws the defence, he may afterwards have his action for
fraud. Id.
18. Transfer of goods in fraud of creditor: knowledge by vendee where
he is party to the agreement. Walsh vs. Kelly, 123.
19. What was hel,A suaeiat sals and delivery within the Statute of
Prauds. Dixn . Bock*, 122.
20. Frandulst sohmdtof crier at pIablie sale. BrotherZinevs4 Swire, 640.
21. Where A. in his shop sold goods to B., which afterwards were claimed
by a third party as being his property, it was held that there was an implied
warranty b A. that he had a good title to the articles sold, and therefore{that B. could recover the money which he had paid for them: .Eicoltz vs.
Bannisger, 498.
22. After goods are bought and received the vendee cannot be held to
terms lpt agreed on, by vendor's delivering to him a bill of sale with such
terms Opon it. Schnchardt vs. Aliens, 54.
23. One whose property has been sold !y another without autbprity, with
his knowledge but without his connivance, may recover its value. Bragg
vs. R. B. Co., 768.
24. Agreement for sale of boat, purchaser to have possession until default
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in payment of instalments, when contract to be void-purchaser cannot
recover the payments already made. Haynes vs. Hart, 191.
VERDICT.
Irregular mode of fixing amount. Boynton vs. Trumbull, 512.
VOLUNTARY SERVICES. See AsSUMPSIT.
WARRANTY. See AGENT, 2; INSURANCE, 6; VENDOR AND VEDEZ, 11, 21.
1. In action for false, 8cienter need not be averred or proved. Schuchardt
vs. Allens, 116.
2. No action lies on warranty of horse paid for in spirituous liquors which
the purchaser could not legally sell. Howard vs. Harrit, 820.
WASTE. See EauiTr, 1-6.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES. See STREAM.
WAY. See EASEMENT.
1. Right does not arise from mere necessity. Tracy vs. Atherton, 56.
2. Right over grantor's other land may pass appurtenant to a grant,
though access otherwise is not impossible. Pettengill vs. Porter, 118.
3. Private way opening on public street, with nothing to show its private
character, is liable to public travel. Danforth vs. Durell, 320.
WESTBURY. THE CASE oF LORD CHANCELLOR, 641
WHARFAGE. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 8.
WILL. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 21; LEGACY.
L Construction.
I. Devise to "remaining children" after death of tenants for life. Turner
vs. Withers, 723.
2. Construction of the words "remaining" or "surviving" as equivalent
to "other," discussed. Id., Note.
3. Devise of land free of a mortgage and subsequent deed by testator to
devisees-executor should pay off the mortgage. Bradford vs. Forbes, 448.
4. Testator gives an absolute interest and adds that if donee does not dis-
pose of it by will it shall go to other persons, this condition is void.
Ifeale vs. Oliver, 320.
. 5. Same words must have the saiie meaning. Harvey vs. Harvey, 320.
6. Legacy held to be chargeable on land. Church vs. Wachter, 192.
7. Probate of will giving bequests, "if I should lose my life during this
voyage," &c. Damon vs. Damon, 192.
II. Execution.
8. Witness may sign out of testator's presence and acknowledge his signa-
ture afterwards. Vaughan vs. Iraughan, 735.
9. Rule as to signing in testator's presence, discussed. Id., .Note.
10. Where the law requires the execution to be in presence of three wit-
nesses, the acknowledgment by testator and two witnesses of their signatures
to a third witness who did not actually see them sign, is not sufficient.
Pope vs. Pope, 384.
11. Part of a codicil actually beneath the signature allowed to stand.
In the Goods of Kimptlon, 320.
12. A will giving a certain sum in trust, "to appropriate ihe same in
such manner as I may, by any instrument in writing, under my hand,
direct and appoint," and an appointment by a separate paper, signed by
the testator, but not duly attested, declaring the appropriation and naming
the beneficiary, does not create a valid bequest in favor of the person thus
declared and appointed by the unattested instrument. Thayer vs. Weilington
et aL, 87.
18. Execution of, is not work or labor, and may be done on Sunday.
- Bennett vs. Brooks, 768.
14. The words " cancelled and annulled" written under a will, constitute
800 INDEX.
WILL.
a cancellation, and the -will cannot be revived by parol declarations of such
purpose. Warner vs. Warner, 851.
15. Married woman's will under a deed of trust of personalty only, made
in another state but in form required in Pennsylvania, passes ground-rents
subsequently acquired. Alexander vs. Parson, 191.
16. Letter announcing death of testator and in a general way his dispo-
sition of his estate, will not establish a nuncupative will-forms generally
requisite. Taylof a Appeal, 192.
WITNESS. See EQurry, 12; EVXDZNCE, 1, 2; MuNioiPrL ConvROATiox, 9.
1. -It is too late to object-to the competency of a witness after his testi-
mony has been given and c6mmented on to the jury by the party objecting.
AlcEnroy et at. vs. Dyer, 166.-
2. May give his "understatding" or "impressiou" derived from memory
but not from'inference. Kiasbury vs. Xoses, 489.
WRIT OF ENTRY.
Error will not lie on the ground that there are no sufficient means of
ascertaining accurately the land described in the verdict. Suiloway vs.
Bal, 118.
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